The Courts must not, in exercise of the contempt jurisdiction, therefore, travel beyond the four corners of the order which is alleged to have been flouted or enter into questions that have not been dealt with or decided in the judgment or the order violation of which is alleged. Only such directions which are explicit in a judgment or order or are plainly self-evident ought to be taken into account for the purpose of consideration as to whether there has been any disobedience or willful violation of the same
In Sudhir Vasudeva vs. M.George Ravishekaran (2014) 3 SCC 373, a 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court observed in the context of exercise of contempt jurisdiction that the power vested in the High Courts as well as the Supreme Court to punish for contempt is a special and rare power available both under the Constitution as well as the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It was held that the very nature of the power casts a sacred duty in the Courts to exercise the same with the greatest of care and caution. This is also necessary as, more often than not, adjudication of a contempt plea involves a process of self-determination of the sweep, meaning and effect of the order in respect of which disobedience is alleged.
The Courts must not, therefore, travel beyond the four corners of the order which is alleged to have been flouted or enter into questions that have not been dealt with or decided in the judgment or the order violation of which is alleged. Only such directions which are explicit in a judgment or order or are plainly self-evident ought to be taken into account for the purpose of consideration as to whether there has been any disobedience or willful violation of the same.
Decided issues cannot be reopened; nor can the plea of equities be considered. The Courts must also ensure that while considering a contempt plea the power available to the Court in other corrective jurisdictions like review or appeal is not trenched upon. No order or direction supplemental to what has been already expressed should be issued by the Court while exercising jurisdiction in the domain of the contempt law; such an exercise is more appropriate in other jurisdictions vested in the Court.
However, in Baranagore Jute Factory PLC. Mazdoor Sangh (BMS) vs. Baranagore Jute Factory PLC (2017) 5 SCC 506 , considering the aforestated precedent, a 2-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court noted that the 3-Judge Bench had clarified therein that directions which are explicit in the judgment or ‘are plainly self-evident’ can be taken into account for the purpose of considering whether there is any disobedience or willful violation. The Bench further held that the Court has a duty to issue appropriate directions for remedying or rectifying the things done in violation of the Court order and in that regard, the Court may even take restitutive measures at any stage of the proceedings.
The 2-Judge Bench had merely echoed the affirmation of the legal position by another 2-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority vs. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd (1996) 4 SCC 622.
The principle that a contemnor ought not to be permitted to enjoy and/or keep the fruits of his contempt was reiterated therein. Reference was made by the Bench to Mohammad Idris vs. Rustam Jehangir Babuji (1984) 4 SCC 216, wherein it was held that undergoing punishment for contempt would not mean that the Court is not entitled to give appropriate directions for remedying and rectifying the things done in violation of its orders. Therefore, the principle that stands crystallized by these judgments is that, in addition to punishing a contemnor for disobeying its orders, the Court can also ensure that such a contemnor does not continue to enjoy the benefits of his disobedience by merely suffering the punishment meted out to him.
In Amit Kumar Das, Joint Secretary, Baitanik Versus Shrimati Hutheesingh Tagore
Charitable Trust 2024 INSC 73, the Supreme Court held that the vacating of the stay order in the appeal by the High Court in exercise of contempt jurisdiction did not assume either a restitutive or a remedying character. Violation of the status quo condition in the stay order stood complete, even as per the High Court, and vacating of the stay order did not have the effect of restoring the parties to their original position or deny the contemnor the benefit of the disobedience which already stood concluded. Violation of a conditional stay order, in the usual course, would entail vacating thereof in a properly constituted proceeding. It was held that by resorting to such a step while exercising contempt jurisdiction, the High Court was not acting in furtherance of the principle adumbrated in the above decisions.
It was also held that the concluded act in violation of the status quo order in relation to possession of the suit premises amounted to ‘civil contempt’ under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and warranted appropriate consequences under the provisions thereof. However, without taking recourse to such a step, the High Court thought it fit to vacate the stay order in the appeal so as to enable the Trust to execute the decree. This action of the High Court was held to clearly transgress the scope and extent of its contempt jurisdiction.