Though the concept of finality of judgment has to be preserved, at the same time, the principle of ex debito justitiae cannot be given a gobye. If the Court finds that the earlier judgment does not lay down a correct position of law, it is always permissible for the Court to reconsider the same and if necessary, to refer it to a larger Bench
Question of law vs. issue of law
There is no doubt that the Court has an extensive power to correct an error or to review its decision but that cannot be done at the cost of doctrine of finality. An issue of law can be overruled later on, but a question of fact cannot be reopened once it has been finally sealed in proceedings inter se between the parties.
It is well settled that when a question of fact has reached finality inter se between the parties, it cannot be reopened in a collateral proceeding. However, an issue of law can be overruled later on.
At one time adherence to the principle of stare decisis was so rigidly followed in the courts governed by the English jurisprudence that departing from an earlier precedent was considered heresy. With the declaration of the practice statement by the House of Lords, the highest court in England was enabled to depart from a previous decision when it appeared right to do so.
The next step forward by the highest court to do justice was to review its judgment inter partes to correct injustice.
The Supreme Court has been conferred the power to review its own judgments under Article 137 of the Constitution. The role of the judiciary to merely interpret and declare the law was the concept of a bygone age. It is no more open to debate as it is fairly settled that the courts can so mould and lay down the law formulating principles and guidelines as to adapt and adjust to the changing conditions of the society, the ultimate objective being to dispense justice.
In the recent years there is a discernible shift in the approach of the final courts in favour of rendering justice on the facts presented before them, without abrogating but bypassing the principle of finality of the judgment (see Union of India v. Raghubir Singh [(1989) 2 SCC 754).
Doctrine of binding precedent
The doctrine of binding precedent, like all principles evolved by man for the regulation of the social order, is circumscribed in its governance by perceptible limitations, limitations arising by reference to the need for readjustment in a changing society, a readjustment of legal norms demanded by a changed social context. This need for adapting the law to new urges in society brings home the truth of the Holmesian aphorism that ‘the life of the law has not been logic it has been experience.
Rendering justice vs. Finality of judgement
The concern of the Court for rendering justice in a cause is not less important than the principle of finality of its judgment. One is faced with competing principles — ensuring certainty and finality of a judgment of the Court of last resort and dispensing justice on reconsideration of a judgment on the ground that it is vitiated being in violation of the principles of natural justice or giving scope for apprehension of bias due to a Judge who participated in the decision making process not disclosing his links with a party to the case, or on account of abuse of the process of the court.
Such a judgment, far from ensuring finality, will always remain under the cloud of uncertainty. Almighty alone is the dispenser of absolute justice — a concept which is not disputed but by a few. Though Judges of the highest court do their best, subject of course to the limitation of human fallibility, yet situations may arise, in the rarest of the rare cases, which would require reconsideration of a final judgment to set right miscarriage of justice complained of.
In such case it would not only be proper but also obligatory both legally and morally to rectify the error. The duty to do justice in these rarest of rare cases shall have to prevail over the policy of certainty of judgment as though it is essentially in the public interest that a final judgment of the final court in the country should not be open to challenge, yet there may be circumstances, as mentioned above, wherein declining to reconsider the judgment would be oppressive to judicial conscience and would cause perpetuation of irremediable injustice.
No man should suffer because of the mistake of the court
Accordingly, the Court, to prevent abuse of its process and to cure a gross miscarriage of justice, may reconsider its judgments in exercise of its inherent power.
One of the first and highest duties of all courts is to take care that the act of the court does no injury to any of the suitors, and when the expression ‘the act of the court’ is used, it does not mean merely the act of the primary court, or of any intermediate court of appeal, but the act of the court as a whole, from the lowest court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest court which finally disposes of the case.
It is the duty of the aggregate of those Tribunals to take care that no act of the court in the course of the whole of the proceedings does an injury to the suitors in the court.
The basic fundamentals of the administration of justice are simple. No man should suffer because of the mistake of the court. No man should suffer a wrong by technical procedure of irregularities. Rules or procedures are the handmaids of justice and not the mistress of the justice. Ex debito justitiae, we must do justice to him. If a man has been wronged so long as it lies within the human machinery of administration of justice that wrong must be remedied. This is a peculiar fact of this case which requires emphasis.
Principle of ex debito justitiae
The principle of ex debito justitiae means that no man should suffer because of the mistake of the court. No man should suffer a wrong by technical procedure of irregularities. The rules of procedure are the handmaidens of justice and not the mistress of justice. If a man has been wronged, so long as the wrong lies within the human machinery of administration of justice, that wrong must be remedied.
All rules of court are nothing but provisions intended to secure proper administration of justice. It is, therefore, essential that they should be made to serve and be subordinate to that purpose.
Procedure is a handmaid and not a mistress of law, intended to subserve and facilitate the cause of justice and not to govern or obstruct it. Like all rules of procedure, this rule demands a construction which would promote this cause Once judicial satisfaction is reached that the direction was not open to be made and it is accepted as a mistake of the court, it is not only appropriate but also the duty of the court to rectify the mistake by exercising inherent powers. Judicial opinion heavily leans in favour of this view that a mistake of the court can be corrected by the court itself without any fetters.
The judge had jurisdiction to correct his own error without entering into a discussion of the merits.
An abuse of the process of the court may be committed by the court or by a party. Where a court employed a procedure in doing something which it never intended to do and there is an abuse of the process of the court it can be corrected.
Where substantial injustice would otherwise result, the Court has, in Their Lordships’ opinion, an inherent power to set aside its own judgments of condemnation so as to let in bona fide claims by parties.
Principle actus curia neminem gravabit — an act of the court shall prejudice no one
Indian authorities are in abundance to support the view that injustice done should be corrected by applying the principle actus curia neminem gravabit — an act of the court shall prejudice no one.
To err is human, is the oftquoted saying. Courts including the apex one are no exception. To own up the mistake when judicial satisfaction is reached does not militatte against its status or authority. Perhaps it would enhance both.
In cases relating to the apex court, no litigant has any opportunity of approaching any higher forum to question its decisions. Once a judicial satisfaction is reached that the direction was not open to be made and it is accepted as a mistake of the court, it is not only appropriate but also the duty of the court to rectify the mistake by exercising its inherent powers. To err is human, and the Courts including the Apex Court are no exception.
Challenge to the final order forming part of the judgment versus challenge to the ratio decidendi of the judgment
There is a fundamental difference between challenge to the final order forming part of the judgment and challenge to the ratio decidendi of the judgment. Broadly speaking, every judgment of superior courts has three segments, namely, (i) the facts and the point at issue; (ii) the reasons for the decision; and (iii) the final order containing the decision. The reasons for the decision or the ratio decidendi is not the final order containing the decision.
Though in a judgment, the ratio decidendi may point to a particular result, the decision (final order relating to relief) may be different and not a natural consequence of the ratio decidendi of the judgment. This may happen either on account of any subsequent event or the need to mould the relief to do complete justice in the matter. It is the ratio decidendi of a judgment and not the final order in the judgment, which forms a precedent. The term “judgment” and “decision” are used, rather loosely, to refer to the entire judgment or the final order or the ratio decidendi of a judgment.
A petition under Article 32 would not be maintainable to challenge or set aside or quash the final order contained in a judgment of this Court. It does not lay down a proposition that the ratio decidendi of any earlier decision cannot be examined or differed in another case. Where violation of a fundamental right of a citizen is alleged in a petition under Article 32, it cannot be dismissed, as not maintainable, merely because it seeks to distinguish or challenge the ratio decidendi of an earlier judgment, except where it is between the same parties and in respect of the same cause of action. Where a legal issue raised in a petition under Article 32 is covered by a decision of this Court, the Court may dismiss the petition following the ratio decidendi of the earlier decision. Such dismissal is not on the ground of “maintainability” but on the ground that the issue raised is not tenable, in view of the law laid down in the earlier decision. But if the Court is satisfied that the issue raised in the later petition requires consideration and in that context the earlier decision requires reexamination, the Court can certainly proceed to examine the matter (or refer the matter to a larger Bench, if the earlier decision is not of a smaller Bench). When the issue is reexamined and a view is taken different from the one taken earlier, a new ratio is laid down. When the ratio decidendi of the earlier decision undergoes such change, the final order of the earlier decision as applicable to the parties to the earlier decision, is in no way altered or disturbed. Therefore, the contention that a writ petition under Article 32 is barred or not maintainable with reference to an issue which is the subject matter of an earlier decision, is not acceptable.
It is clear that the ratio decidendi of an earlier decision can be reexamined or differed with in another case.
If the Court is satisfied that the issue raised in the later petition requires consideration and in that context, the earlier decision requires reexamination, the Court can certainly proceed to examine the matter or refer the matter to a larger Bench, if the earlier decision is not of a smaller Bench. The contention that a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was barred or not maintainable with reference to an issue which was the subject matter of an earlier decision was specially rejected.
In conclusion, though the concept of finality of judgment has to be preserved, at the same time, the principle of ex debito justitiae cannot be given a gobye. If the Court finds that the earlier judgment does not lay down a correct position of law, it is always permissible for the Court to reconsider the same and if necessary, to refer it to a larger Bench.
These principles were followed by the Supreme Court in HDFC Bank vs. UOI and it was held an earlier judgement on whether the RBI is entitled to direct private Banks disclosure confidential and sensitive information pertaining to customers’ affairs etc under the Right to Information Act, 2005 requires to be reconsidered.
FILING OF THE FORM 1B APPLICATION & AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT DATED 26.11.2024.
Nicholas N CHIN Thu, Dec 12, 2024 at 4:42 PM
To: SC Court of Appeal Office
The Manager of the Court of Appeal
Supreme Court of Western Australia
Dear Sir
THE PLAINLY WRONG DECISION OF VAUGHAN J IN SCWA CIV: 2074 OF 2018
I humbly refer to my last email reply to you today.
Please see the website: When can a Court review its own judgements and correct mistakes therein? – Legal Updates where it is entitled:
When can a Court review its own judgements and correct mistakes therein?
Though the concept of finality of judgment has to be preserved, at the same time, the principle of ex debito justitiae cannot be given a gobye. If the Court finds that the earlier judgment does not lay down a correct position of law, it is always permissible for the Court to reconsider the same and if necessary, to refer it to a larger Bench
The COURT OF APPEAL in CACV 88 OF 2018 must take steps of its volition to correct its own errors without the need of an appeal by the Applicant under the following principles of law:
1) Principle actus curia neminem gravabit — an act of the court shall prejudice no one:
I quote the wordings here: It is the duty of the COA to rectify the mistakes by exercising its inherent powers after looking into the court records.
“In cases relating to the apex court, no litigant has any opportunity of approaching any higher forum to question its decisions. Once a judicial satisfaction is reached that the direction was not open to be made and it is accepted as a mistake of the court, it is not only appropriate but also the duty of the court to rectify the mistake by exercising its inherent powers. To err is human, and the Courts including the Apex Court are no exception.”
2) Principle of ex debito justitiae
I quote the following words:
“The principle of ex debito justitiae means that no man should suffer because of the mistake of the court. No man should suffer a wrong by technical procedure of irregularities. The rules of procedure are the handmaidens of justice and not the mistress of justice. If a man has been wronged, so long as the wrong lies within the human machinery of administration of justice, that wrong must be remedied.”
3) Challenge to the final order forming part of the judgment versus challenge to the ratio decidendi of the judgment
I challenged the ratio decidendi of Justice Vaughan in SCWA CIV: 2074 OF 2018 in that His Honour clearly states that the S.52PLAISQE does require a formal agreement between the parties just as the rule of Wheeldon v Burrow and many other authorities (which I have quoted) do not require such formal agreement to maintain that claim. I quote the following:
“There is a fundamental difference between challenge to the final order forming part of the judgment and challenge to the ratio decidendi of the judgment. Broadly speaking, every judgment of superior courts has three segments, namely, (i) the facts and the point at issue; (ii) the reasons for the decision; and (iii) the final order containing the decision. The reasons for the decision or the ratio decidendi is not the final order containing the decision.”
4) No man should suffer because of the mistake of the court:
As the lawful Plaintiff (who is the beneficiary of the trust for which I as its original purchaser, had nominated my son as its registered owner) of the stolen property and stolen converted fixtures, I should not suffer the consequences of the mistakes of the aggregates of the WA Justice system:
“Accordingly, the Court, to prevent abuse of its process and to cure a gross miscarriage of justice, may reconsider its judgments in exercise of its inherent power.
One of the first and highest duties of all courts is to take care that the act of the court does no injury to any of the suitors, and when the expression ‘the act of the court’ is used, it does not mean merely the act of the primary court, or of any intermediate court of appeal, but the act of the court as a whole, from the lowest court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest court which finally disposes of the case.
It is the duty of the aggregate of those Tribunals to take care that no act of the court in the course of the whole of the proceedings does an injury to the suitors in the court.”
5. Rendering justice vs. Finality of judgement
I am asking for the court to render me justice as one who has been declared a vexatious litigant. The Court has a duty to do a mandatory filter test under s.4 and 6 of the VPRA to find out if indeed I as the lawful plaintiff is indeed frivolous and vexatious for my claim in S.52PLAISQE and Converted Fixtures.
As such I am asking for justice and not contesting the Finality of Judgment in these terms, which I quote:
“The concern of the Court for rendering justice in a cause is not less important than the principle of finality of its judgment. One is faced with competing principles — ensuring certainty and finality of a judgment of the Court of last resort and dispensing justice on reconsideration of a judgment on the ground that it is vitiated being in violation of the principles of natural justice or giving scope for apprehension of bias due to a Judge who participated in the decision making process not disclosing his links with a party to the case, or on account of abuse of the process of the court.
Such a judgment, far from ensuring finality, will always remain under the cloud of uncertainty. Almighty alone is the dispenser of absolute justice — a concept which is not disputed but by a few. Though Judges of the highest court do their best, subject of course to the limitation of human fallibility, yet situations may arise, in the rarest of the rare cases, which would require reconsideration of a final judgment to set right miscarriage of justice complained of.”
I will not rest in peace when my hard earned property has been stolen without a remedy and the crime is a continuing one and wont be abated until I got the justice that I seek from this Honourable Court.
Kind regards
NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN.
FILING OF THE FORM 1B APPLICATION & AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT DATED 26.11.2024.
Nicholas N CHIN Thu, Dec 12, 2024 at 4:42 PM
To: SC Court of Appeal Office
The Manager of the Court of Appeal
Supreme Court of Western Australia
Dear Sir
THE PLAINLY WRONG DECISION OF VAUGHAN J IN SCWA CIV: 2074 OF 2018
I humbly refer to my last email reply to you today.
Please see the website: When can a Court review its own judgements and correct mistakes therein? – Legal Updates where it is entitled:
When can a Court review its own judgements and correct mistakes therein?
Though the concept of finality of judgment has to be preserved, at the same time, the principle of ex debito justitiae cannot be given a gobye. If the Court finds that the earlier judgment does not lay down a correct position of law, it is always permissible for the Court to reconsider the same and if necessary, to refer it to a larger Bench
The COURT OF APPEAL in CACV 88 OF 2018 must take steps of its volition to correct its own errors without the need of an appeal by the Applicant under the following principles of law:
1) Principle actus curia neminem gravabit — an act of the court shall prejudice no one:
I quote the wordings here: It is the duty of the COA to rectify the mistakes by exercising its inherent powers after looking into the court records.
“In cases relating to the apex court, no litigant has any opportunity of approaching any higher forum to question its decisions. Once a judicial satisfaction is reached that the direction was not open to be made and it is accepted as a mistake of the court, it is not only appropriate but also the duty of the court to rectify the mistake by exercising its inherent powers. To err is human, and the Courts including the Apex Court are no exception.”
2) Principle of ex debito justitiae
I quote the following words:
“The principle of ex debito justitiae means that no man should suffer because of the mistake of the court. No man should suffer a wrong by technical procedure of irregularities. The rules of procedure are the handmaidens of justice and not the mistress of justice. If a man has been wronged, so long as the wrong lies within the human machinery of administration of justice, that wrong must be remedied.”
3) Challenge to the final order forming part of the judgment versus challenge to the ratio decidendi of the judgment
I challenged the ratio decidendi of Justice Vaughan in SCWA CIV: 2074 OF 2018 in that His Honour clearly states that the S.52PLAISQE does require a formal agreement between the parties just as the rule of Wheeldon v Burrow and many other authorities (which I have quoted) do not require such formal agreement to maintain that claim. I quote the following:
“There is a fundamental difference between challenge to the final order forming part of the judgment and challenge to the ratio decidendi of the judgment. Broadly speaking, every judgment of superior courts has three segments, namely, (i) the facts and the point at issue; (ii) the reasons for the decision; and (iii) the final order containing the decision. The reasons for the decision or the ratio decidendi is not the final order containing the decision.”
4) No man should suffer because of the mistake of the court:
As the lawful Plaintiff (who is the beneficiary of the trust for which I as its original purchaser, had nominated my son as its registered owner) of the stolen property and stolen converted fixtures, I should not suffer the consequences of the mistakes of the aggregates of the WA Justice system:
“Accordingly, the Court, to prevent abuse of its process and to cure a gross miscarriage of justice, may reconsider its judgments in exercise of its inherent power.
One of the first and highest duties of all courts is to take care that the act of the court does no injury to any of the suitors, and when the expression ‘the act of the court’ is used, it does not mean merely the act of the primary court, or of any intermediate court of appeal, but the act of the court as a whole, from the lowest court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest court which finally disposes of the case.
It is the duty of the aggregate of those Tribunals to take care that no act of the court in the course of the whole of the proceedings does an injury to the suitors in the court.”
5. Rendering justice vs. Finality of judgement
I am asking for the court to render me justice as one who has been declared a vexatious litigant. The Court has a duty to do a mandatory filter test under s.4 and 6 of the VPRA to find out if indeed I as the lawful plaintiff is indeed frivolous and vexatious for my claim in S.52PLAISQE and Converted Fixtures.
As such I am asking for justice and not contesting the Finality of Judgment in these terms, which I quote:
“The concern of the Court for rendering justice in a cause is not less important than the principle of finality of its judgment. One is faced with competing principles — ensuring certainty and finality of a judgment of the Court of last resort and dispensing justice on reconsideration of a judgment on the ground that it is vitiated being in violation of the principles of natural justice or giving scope for apprehension of bias due to a Judge who participated in the decision making process not disclosing his links with a party to the case, or on account of abuse of the process of the court.
Such a judgment, far from ensuring finality, will always remain under the cloud of uncertainty. Almighty alone is the dispenser of absolute justice — a concept which is not disputed but by a few. Though Judges of the highest court do their best, subject of course to the limitation of human fallibility, yet situations may arise, in the rarest of the rare cases, which would require reconsideration of a final judgment to set right miscarriage of justice complained of.”
I will not rest in peace when my hard earned property has been stolen without a remedy and the crime is a continuing one and wont be abated until I got the justice that I seek from this Honourable Court.
Kind regards
NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN.
FILING OF THE FORM 1B APPLICATION & AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT DATED 26.11.2024.
Nicholas N CHIN Thu, Dec 12, 2024 at 4:42 PM
To: SC Court of Appeal Office
The Manager of the Court of Appeal
Supreme Court of Western Australia
Dear Sir
THE PLAINLY WRONG DECISION OF VAUGHAN J IN SCWA CIV: 2074 OF 2018
I humbly refer to my last email reply to you today.
Please see the website: When can a Court review its own judgements and correct mistakes therein? – Legal Updates where it is entitled:
When can a Court review its own judgements and correct mistakes therein?
Though the concept of finality of judgment has to be preserved, at the same time, the principle of ex debito justitiae cannot be given a gobye. If the Court finds that the earlier judgment does not lay down a correct position of law, it is always permissible for the Court to reconsider the same and if necessary, to refer it to a larger Bench
The COURT OF APPEAL in CACV 88 OF 2018 must take steps of its volition to correct its own errors without the need of an appeal by the Applicant under the following principles of law:
1) Principle actus curia neminem gravabit — an act of the court shall prejudice no one:
I quote the wordings here: It is the duty of the COA to rectify the mistakes by exercising its inherent powers after looking into the court records.
“In cases relating to the apex court, no litigant has any opportunity of approaching any higher forum to question its decisions. Once a judicial satisfaction is reached that the direction was not open to be made and it is accepted as a mistake of the court, it is not only appropriate but also the duty of the court to rectify the mistake by exercising its inherent powers. To err is human, and the Courts including the Apex Court are no exception.”
2) Principle of ex debito justitiae
I quote the following words:
“The principle of ex debito justitiae means that no man should suffer because of the mistake of the court. No man should suffer a wrong by technical procedure of irregularities. The rules of procedure are the handmaidens of justice and not the mistress of justice. If a man has been wronged, so long as the wrong lies within the human machinery of administration of justice, that wrong must be remedied.”
3) Challenge to the final order forming part of the judgment versus challenge to the ratio decidendi of the judgment
I challenged the ratio decidendi of Justice Vaughan in SCWA CIV: 2074 OF 2018 in that His Honour clearly states that the S.52PLAISQE does require a formal agreement between the parties just as the rule of Wheeldon v Burrow and many other authorities (which I have quoted) do not require such formal agreement to maintain that claim. I quote the following:
“There is a fundamental difference between challenge to the final order forming part of the judgment and challenge to the ratio decidendi of the judgment. Broadly speaking, every judgment of superior courts has three segments, namely, (i) the facts and the point at issue; (ii) the reasons for the decision; and (iii) the final order containing the decision. The reasons for the decision or the ratio decidendi is not the final order containing the decision.”
4) No man should suffer because of the mistake of the court:
As the lawful Plaintiff (who is the beneficiary of the trust for which I as its original purchaser, had nominated my son as its registered owner) of the stolen property and stolen converted fixtures, I should not suffer the consequences of the mistakes of the aggregates of the WA Justice system:
“Accordingly, the Court, to prevent abuse of its process and to cure a gross miscarriage of justice, may reconsider its judgments in exercise of its inherent power.
One of the first and highest duties of all courts is to take care that the act of the court does no injury to any of the suitors, and when the expression ‘the act of the court’ is used, it does not mean merely the act of the primary court, or of any intermediate court of appeal, but the act of the court as a whole, from the lowest court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest court which finally disposes of the case.
It is the duty of the aggregate of those Tribunals to take care that no act of the court in the course of the whole of the proceedings does an injury to the suitors in the court.”
5. Rendering justice vs. Finality of judgement
I am asking for the court to render me justice as one who has been declared a vexatious litigant. The Court has a duty to do a mandatory filter test under s.4 and 6 of the VPRA to find out if indeed I as the lawful plaintiff is indeed frivolous and vexatious for my claim in S.52PLAISQE and Converted Fixtures.
As such I am asking for justice and not contesting the Finality of Judgment in these terms, which I quote:
“The concern of the Court for rendering justice in a cause is not less important than the principle of finality of its judgment. One is faced with competing principles — ensuring certainty and finality of a judgment of the Court of last resort and dispensing justice on reconsideration of a judgment on the ground that it is vitiated being in violation of the principles of natural justice or giving scope for apprehension of bias due to a Judge who participated in the decision making process not disclosing his links with a party to the case, or on account of abuse of the process of the court.
Such a judgment, far from ensuring finality, will always remain under the cloud of uncertainty. Almighty alone is the dispenser of absolute justice — a concept which is not disputed but by a few. Though Judges of the highest court do their best, subject of course to the limitation of human fallibility, yet situations may arise, in the rarest of the rare cases, which would require reconsideration of a final judgment to set right miscarriage of justice complained of.”
I will not rest in peace when my hard earned property has been stolen without a remedy and the crime is a continuing one and wont be abated until I got the justice that I seek from this Honourable Court.
Kind regards
NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN.
Nicholas N CHIN
Attachments
3:19 PM (6 hours ago)
to SC
The Acting Manager
Court of Appeal Office
Dear Sir
Thank you for your reply letter to me dated 12.12.2024 with regard to the issue: RE: STOLEN EASEMENT RIGHTS & PLANT & EQUIPMENT OF UNIT 1/383 VICTORIA ROAD MALAGA WA 6090 12.2.2016 BY TIEN CUONG NGUYEN: HOW DO I SOLVE THIS PROBLEM?
1) There is no longer any requirement for me to appeal either to the Supreme Court of Western Australia (as it has been done through Lemonis J in CIV: 1973 OF 2024) nor:
2) an appeal to the District Court of Western Australia (as it has been done through the DCWA CIV: 096 of 2023 through DCJ Tovey).
3) There is no more need for me to appeal the single issue which focussed on the error of law and error of fact of Justice Vaughan in CIV: 2074 OF 2018 based on the PLAINLY WRONG PRINCIPLE OF THE RULE OF LAW (Rule of Law). See the attached Glover Article.
4) Justice Lemonis is clear on his non-jurisdiction to deal with the matter which stems from my Appeal from PMC GCLM 10010/2021 CHIN V NGUYEN of Magistrate Decision dated 4.4.2022 and is handing over the matter back to the District Court of WA in Appeal No. 26 of 2024 on the Rule of Law (Justice Lemonis Implicit Direction).
5) The District Court WA acting on the Justice Lemonis Implicit Direction through its officer Gabrielle is clear that the DCWA has done a wrong through DCJ Tovey in not settling the Appeal No. 26 of 2024 in accordance with the Rule of Law (Gabrielle on Rule of Law).
6) Gabrielle on Rule of Law on 10.12.2024 is clear that it is RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY of the Court of Appeal in CACV 88 OF 2018
to follow the PLAINLY WRONG PRINCIPLE OF THE RULE OF LAW of Justice Vaughan (Accountability of COA).
7) The Accountability of COA moves on one issue of the Rule of Law: S.52PLAISQE on the following grounds:
7.1) Property Law Act, 1969 legislated the Rule of Law of Wheeldon v Burrows into Part V of PLA.
7.2) Part V of PLA is about: implied covenants which is quasi easements in terms of the following:
Part V — Covenants
45. Covenants for title implied 25
46. Construction of implied covenants 27
47. Benefits of covenants relating to land 27
48. Burden of covenants relating to land 28
49. Construction of covenants affecting land 28
50. Covenants to be joint and several 28
51. Effect of covenant with 2 or more jointly 29
52. Covenants and agreements entered into by a person with himself and another or others
7.3) Implied Quasi Easements does not require a formal agreement between the Tenants and the Owner in the 2004 Lease and the 2010 Lease.
7.4) Justice Vaughan is plainly wrong in denying the Owner or Lessor in CIV: 2074 OF 2018 the right to claim damages and restitution of the Property Stolen by Tien Cuong NGUYEN on 12.2.2016 from the Lawful Plaintiff (PLAINLY WRONG VAUGHAN J DECISION). See attachment.
7.5. The Court of Appeal in CACV88 OF 2018 acted without jurisdiction to follow the PLAINLY WRONG VAUGHAN J DECISION.See attachment: Glover article.
7.6. My Application before Justice Lemonis in SCWA 1973 OF 2024 is all about the S.4(1)(d) of VPRA Order of Murray J Leave and the same applies to my Affidavit filed before DCWA in 127 sworn 26.11.2024 pages as received by Gabrielle explains everything about this VPRA Leave: it explains the right of a Declared Vexatious Litigant who has a right to be heard for each new proceedings (VPRA Leave).
7.7. The Void or Voidable Decision affecting the PLAINLY WRONG DECISION RULE does not require an appeal as it has already been done so and the matter is now referred by the DCWA to the COA by reason of its accountability: the legal system is presumed to do no wrong and if there is a plainly wrong decision the Accountable Court in the COA must do its duty to recall its decision and to do it right. No criminal wrongs can be condoned by a legally constituted court.
7.8. Please provide me with the necessary form so that I can fill it up in order to enable the Court of Appeal to gather all the court records from:
7.1) the Perth Magistrates Courts relating to PMC-GCLM 10010/2021;
7.2) the DCWA CIV: 096 OF 2023 and Appeal No. 26 of 2024.
7.3) the COA Decision in CACV: 88 OF 2018;
7.4) the Vaughan J Decision in SCWA: CIV: 2074 OF 2018;
7.5) the High Court Decision in P143 of 2019.
to correct its error having regard to my attached document labelled as REVISIT OF 2074 OF 2018.
7.9. Wrong decisions by courts of law cannot be left for posterity uncorrected.
8. The Appeal documents to the COA are all ready for the Lemonis J and for CIV: 096 OF DCWA which now requires a change of forum as the latter has decided that it has no jurisdiction to deal with a matter already decided by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of WA in CACV88 OF 1988 as it is lower in rank in the hierarchy of the court system in WA.
Kind regards
NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN (Mob: 0411930635) landline: 0892757440
Nicholas N CHIN
Dec 10, 2024, 6:51 PM (2 days ago)
to Associate, Associate, associate.registrar.allison, associate.registrar.gilich, associate.registrar.whitbread, associate.registrar.eaton, associate.registrar.hosking, associate.registrar.fatharly, associate.registrar.griffin, associate.registrar.nelson, SC, Chief.Justice.Chambers, District
To All the Registrar of the Supreme Court of WA
Gabrielle of DCWA
RE: STOLEN EASEMENT RIGHTS & PLANT & EQUIPMENT OF UNIT 1/383 VICTORIA ROAD MALAGA WA 6090 12.2.2016 BY TIEN CUONG NGUYEN: HOW DO I SOLVE THIS PROBLEM?
I refer to the above matter and wish to state the following:
1) The matter was decided by Justice Vaughan in 2018 in CIV: 2074 OF 2018 on an exparte basis without jurisdiction (Vaughan J Decision).
2) The Vaughan J Decision was appealed to the Court of WA in CACV 88 OF 2018 again without jurisdiction (COA Decision).
3) The COA decision matter was appealed to the High Court of Australia and was decided again without jurisdiction (HCA Decision).
4) All the three preceding Decision was revived at the Perth Magistrates Court in GLCM 10010/2021 CHIN V NGUYEN again without jurisdiction on 4.4.2022 (the PMC Ward Decision).
4) The PMC Ward Decision was appealed to the District Court of WA and was decided by DCJ Tovey in CIV: 096 OF 2023 on 18.7.2023 due to a technical error of a Missing Affidavit and without jurisdiction (The DCWA Decision).
5) The DCWA Decision was before Justice Lemonis of SCWA and again was made without jurisdiction in CIV: 1973 OF 2024 on the ground that it should be appealed to the DCWA (The Lemonis J Decision).
6) Gabrielle of the DCWA has decided that only the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction in the above preceding five items as per her forwarded letter dated 10.12.2024 (Court of Appeal Jurisdiction).
7) The preceding six items all revolve around the single issue of the error of Justice Vaughan which contradicts the rule of law in the following terms:
7.1) The Wheeldon v Burrows principle that does not require a formal written agreement for the protection of the Implied Quasi Easement Rights of Unit 1/383 Victoria Road Lunch Bar first created by the original owner of the Lot 10 aka 383 Victoria Road Malaga which was created St. Marks Investment Pty Ltd on 4.8.1998 (Wheeldon v Burrows Rule of Law).
7.2. The Wheeldon v Burrows Rule of Law is legislated into Part V of the Law of Property Act, 1969 WA particularly s.52 aka S.52PLAISQE which is the acronym for S.52 PROPERTY LAW ACT, 1969 WA implied Quasi Easement: THIS RULE OF LAW IS RECOGNISED AUSTRALIA WIDE AND IS RECOGNISED INTERNATIONALLY AS EVIDENCED BY THE BREKKHUS DOCUMENT and Professor KNUD Hermanssen Document (S.52PLAISQE).
7.3. The S.52PLAISQE and the Coverted Fixtures are incorporated into the 2004 Lease and the 2010 Lease entered into between my nominee PAUL CHUNG K CHIN: the breach of which I (NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN) as the original owner and beneficiary of the Trust created by me for Paul to be its registered owner has the right to be the lawful plaintiff in the PMC Decision (Nicholas N Chin as Lawful Plaintiff).
7.4. Gabrielle of DCWA has originally intended that I begin anew the Lemonis J Decision in DCWA CIV: 096 OF 2023 the subject of the DCJ Tovey Decision but she is now referring the matter to the COA (Gabrielle).
7.5. On 28.11.2024 filed a total of 127 pages which consists of a Notice of Originating Motion for efiling in response to Gabrielle but Gabrielle now wants the Court of Appeal to grant me the leave and to commence the action (Court of Appeal Leave).
7.6. For the Court of Appeal Leave, please let me know the directions to proceed with it using the prepared documents scheduled for filing with DCWA but now rejected by Gabrielle (Directions from the COA).
8. In the meantime I presume that Gabrielle will forward all my documents to the COA for the purpose of the Directions from COA: I shall be glad to hear the Directions from the COA so that I could take this matter further.
Kind regards
NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN mob: 0411930635
387 Alexander Drive, DIANELLA WA 6059